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The Ukraine Crisis of 2014 which led to the annexation of Crimea by 
Russia has been one of the worst European issues since the end of the Cold 
War. NATO’s relations with Russia have worsened ever since Russian troops 
invaded and annexed the Crimean peninsula in 2014. This paper examines 
why Russia intervened and eventually annexed Crimea during the Ukraine 
crisis through theoretical approaches in IR (international relations). In 
addition, the paper also discusses the consequences of Russia’s actions in 
Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. This paper argues that Russia 
intervened and annexed Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 because of 
NATO’s expansion policy in eastern Europe. The study was conducted using 
a qualitative and a non-positivist approach to research (interpretivist) which is 
centered on the humanistic view of the social sciences.  On the one hand, the 
findings of this study support my central thesis; it revealed that NATO’s 
expansion policy in eastern Europe was the cause of Russia’s actions in 
Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. On the other hand, the findings of 
this study revealed that there are alternative factors that also motivated Russia 
to intervene and annex Crimea from Ukraine such as nationalism, identity, and 
Russia’s quest for great power status. Further, Russia’s invasion and eventual 
annexation of Crimea without the consent of Ukrainian authorities had several 
consequences. For instance, it caused tension between Russia and NATO, 
increased military spending, and led to numerous international sanctions. 
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1.  Introduction 
Great Power Politics is a concept commonly used by scholars in the 
field of international relations (IR). In the IR field, “great power politics” 
refers to the pursuit of material power by powerful states in the international 
system to achieve security (Abebe, 2009: 4). John Mearsheimer a political 
scientist and a leading IR scholar who belongs to the realist school of thought 
contends that the period of great-power rivalry is not over because major 
powers still fear each other in the contemporary world (Mearsheimer, 2001). 
Mearsheimer’s view is built on an “offensive realist” theory of world politics 
which assumes that the deep insecurity generated by the anarchic international 
system makes great power to act aggressively toward each other preventing 
rivals from gaining power even if such moves risk war (Mearsheimer, 2001: 
36). This paper systematically analyzes the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 between 
Russia and the West which is one critical incident of contemporary great 
power politics. By Ukraine crisis, I am referring to Russia’s intervention and 
annexation of Crimea in 2014. 
The paper looks at the background conditions, causes, and 
consequences of the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. The crisis which led to Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea represents the biggest geopolitical shock to the 
European security system since the end of the Cold War (Larsen, 2014: 7). 
Over the years, there have been conflicting debates on the reasons behind 
Russia’s intervention and annexation of the Crimean peninsula during the 
Ukraine Crisis of 2014. For example, on the one hand, some scholars claimed 
that Russia intervened in Ukraine and annexed the Crimean peninsula to 
protect its nationals from the chaos in Ukraine following the ousting of 
Ukraine’s pro-Russian president Yanukovych (Balouziyeh, 2014). On the 
other hand, some scholars argue that Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula 
because of its geopolitical ambitions (Treisman, 2016: 47). Because of these 
debates, it is therefore important to find out the true reasons behind Russia’s 
intervention and annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in 2014. Hence, 
a central aim of this paper is to analyze the rationale behind Russia’s 
intervention and annexation of Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 
through theoretical approaches in IR. John W. Creswell explains that the 
research questions of a study should be a broad attempt for exploring the 
central phenomenon of the study (2009: 129). Therefore, the formulated 
research question of this study is: 
• Why did Russia intervene and annex Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis 
of 2014? 
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I decided to ask the research question above because I thought it would be 
interesting to know why Russia behave the way it did in Crimea during the 
Ukraine Crisis of 2014. Besides, this crisis is an interesting topic because it is 
one of the most talk-about crises in recent years. Moreover, the crisis is one of 
the worst post-Cold War security crises that have worsened relations between 
Russia and the West, thereby threatening international peace and security. This 
paper argues that Russia intervened and annexed Crimea during the Ukraine 
Crisis of 2014 because of NAT0’s expansion policy in eastern Europe. 
 
2.  Historical Background 
Before 2014, the Crimean peninsula was officially part of Ukraine; 
however, Crimea had its own parliament and government with power over 
agriculture, tourism, and public infrastructure (Buchanan, 2014). The majority 
of Crimea’s population is made up of ethnic Russians, while Ukrainians and 
Crimean Tatar make up the minority population. In the “Budapest 
Memorandum” signed by Russia, Ukraine, the UK, and the United States in 
1994, the UK, Russia, and the United States essentially consecrated the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine as an independent state 
(Deutsche Welle, 2014). In other words, Russia and these western countries 
promised that none of them would ever threaten or use force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine (Ibid). However, 
Russia decided to violate this accord when it decided to use force to invade 
and annex Crimea in 2014 without permission from the Ukrainian 
government.  
The events that led to the annexation of Crimea started in November 
2013 when Viktor Yanukovych, who was president at the time and pro-
Russian, decided to suspend the signing of the Ukraine-European Union 
Association Agreement. He refused to sign this agreement with the EU 
because he was pro-Russian and because he came to power in 2010 with the 
support of ethnic Russian voters in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. He openly 
stated in the media that he was rejecting the EU agreement because “Ukraine 
could not afford to sacrifice trade with Russia who opposes the deal” (Ibid), 
proving his strong allegiance to Russia. 
The protest that started against President Viktor Yanukovych in late 
November 2013 intensified until early 2014 when he was ousted from power 
by pro-EU protesters in Kiev, Ukraine’s capital city. The ousting of Ukraine’s 
pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych angered Russian President 
Vladimir Putin and he decided to send Russian armed forces to take over 
control of Crimea from Ukraine. After taking over control of Crimea from the 
Ukrainian government, authorities in Crimea with the help of Russia hastily 
organized an independence referendum on March 16, 2014, for citizens of 
Crimea to decide if they wanted to become part of Russia. Because the 
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majority population of Crimea was ethnic Russians, the territory voted 
overwhelmingly (97%) to become part of Russia (Ibid). 
Following the referendum, Russia annexed Crimea in early 2014 and 
made it part of Russia. The independence referendum, the annexation of 
Crimea, and its subsequent incorporation into the Russian Federation caused 
serious tension between Russia and the West. Ukraine and many western 
countries condemned the referendum and Russia’s annexation of Crimea as 
illegal (Christie, 2015). On the other, Russia and authorities in Crimea argued 
that the referendum was legal. The discourse of “two Ukraine” has dominated 
debates in the country since independence and shaped its perception in the 
West and Russia (Zhurzhenko, 2014: 249). This discourse juxtaposes the 
Ukrainian-speaking Pro-European west and the Pro-Russian east as two 
historical and cultural entities, informed by conflicting memories and 
antagonistic identities that have little chance of coexisting as a united country. 
The Ukraine Crisis of 2014 has attracted the attention of many scholars around 
the world and several studies have been conducted on the crisis (for example, 
Costea, 2016; Sperling and Webber, 2017). 
However, most scholars that have conducted studies on the 2014 
Ukraine crisis looked at the crisis from different perspectives. For instance, 
Ana-Maria Costea in 2016 conducted a study on the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. 
Her study analyzed the degree to which the events from the Ukraine Crisis of 
2014 were predictable. She conducted her study using documentary analysis 
(both primary and secondary sources). She argued that the events from the 
Ukraine Crisis of 2014 do not pose themselves as a surprise because almost 
all the elements that were developed or were already present there were 
predictable (Costea, 2016: 344). Costea explains that in Ukraine, the domestic 
fragmented situation between the voters created huge discrepancies in terms 
of political choices and ultimately centrifugal behaviors (Costea, 2016: 345). 
Another genre of writing on the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 is the work of James 
Sperling and Mark Webber conducted in 2017. The authors looked at the 
impact of the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. Their findings revealed that the Ukraine 
Crisis of 2014 has resulted in Russia being explicitly identified as a source of 
threat by NATO which has triggered a successful collective re-securitization 
by the Alliance (2017: 19). In addition, they argued that a framework that 
demonstrates NATO’s standing as a securitizing actor has potential relevance 
to other regional security organizations (Sperling and Webber, 2017: 22). 
 
3.  Literature Review 
This section reviews the existing literature on the independent variable 
of the research question of this paper (the causes of Russia’s intervention and 
annexation of Crimea). It reviews the existing literature under the following 
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subheadings “causal argument” and “debates in the literature/scholarly 
contributions.” 
 
3.1.  Causal Argument  
As aforementioned, few studies have been conducted on the reasons 
for Russia’s intervention and annexation of Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis 
of 2014. These studies present competing independent variables on why 
Russia intervened and annexed Crimea during the crisis. For example, a study 
by Roy Allison in 2014 assessed in detail the reasons for Russia’s military 
intervention in the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 which led to the annexation of 
Crimea. Allison argued that there are two reasons why Russia intervened in 
the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 (1) geopolitical competition (2) identity and 
ideational factors (2014: 1268-1294). Allison explained that these two reasons 
played a role in Russia’s intervention and annexation of Crimea in 2014. 
Another study conducted by David Lane in 2016 examines the motivations for 
Russia’s actions in the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. Unlike Allison who argued that 
Russia intervened in Ukraine because of geopolitical, identity, and ideational 
factors, Lane argued that Russia intervened in the Ukraine crisis and annexed 
Crimea from Ukraine because of the expansion of NATO in eastern Europe 
(Lane, 2016: 502-503). 
Mearsheimer 2014; Bebler 2015; Ericson & Zeager 2015 all agree with 
Lane that  NATO’s expansion policy in eastern Europe near Russia’s borders 
pushed Russia to annex Crimea from Ukraine during the Ukraine Crisis of 
2014. Similarly, Davis Christopher 2016 and Kamp Karl-Heinz 2014 contend 
that NATO’s expansion policy eastward near Russia’s borders pushed Russia 
to intervened and annexed Crimea from Ukraine during the Ukraine Crisis of 
2014. On the other hand, (Lindley-French 2014; Kuzio & D’Anieri 2018; 
Masters 2020) seem to disagree. They do not see NATO’s expansion policy in 
eastern Europe as the cause of Russia’s intervention and annexation of Crimea 
during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. However, they agree with Allison that 
Russia intervened and annexed Crimea during the crisis because of its 
geopolitical considerations (Lindley-French 2014; Kuzio & D’Anieri 2018; 
Masters 2020). 
Furthermore, Viacheslav Morozov in 2017 analyzed why the majority 
of Russian citizens in Russia supported Russia’s intervention and annexation 
of Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. The author argued that the 
majority of Russians supported Russia’s intervention and annexation of 
Crimea in 2014 because of the propaganda spread by the Russian government 
about the West and because of the idea of “Russian identity” (Morozov, 2017: 
4). Marozov contends that most Russians view the people of Crimea and 
Russia as one people which made them to support Putin’s move to annex 
Crimea from Ukraine during the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Teper confirms 
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Marozov’s argument when he argued that the notion of protecting “Russian 
identity” also motivated Russia to annex the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine 
because the majority population of Crimea was ethnic Russians and Russia 
saw these people as Russians (Teper, 2015: 380).  
Again Averre (2016) and Zhurzhenko (2014) also agree with Teper 
and Marozov that Russia was forced to behave the way that it did in Crimea 
during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 because it wanted to protect the “Russian 
national identity” since it saw the people of Crimea as Russians. Zhurzhenko 
went further to argue that during the Ukraine Crisis, Russia increased its 
support for pro-Russian groups and organizations in eastern Ukraine 
especially those that defended the Russian speakers against “Ukrainization” 
and opposed the pro-Western course of the Ukrainian government (2014: 
258). Finally, another study conducted by Daniel Treisman in 2016 analyzed 
the reasons why Russian president Vladimir Putin took Crimea from Ukraine 
during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. The findings of Triesman’s study also 
revealed that Russia intervened in the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 and annexed 
Crimea because of the threat of NATO’s expansion (Triesman, 2016: 47). 
Triesman argued that by annexing Ukraine’s territory by force, Putin 
overturned in a single stroke the assumptions on which post-Cold War 
European order had rested (Ibid). 
 
3.2.  Debates in the Literature/Scholarly Contribution 
The findings of the aforementioned studies reviewed above have 
revealed significant debates on the reasons that influenced Russia’s 
intervention and eventual annexation of Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis of 
2014. The literature reviewed shows that work on the reasons why Russia 
intervened and annexed Crimea during the crisis can be divided into three 
main groups. The first group emphasizes NATO’s expansion in eastern 
Europe as the main reason behind Russia’s intervention and annexation of 
Crimea during the 2014 Ukraine crisis (Mearsheimer, 2014; Bebler, 2015; 
Wolff, 2015; Lane; 2016; Davis, 2016; Kamp, 2014; Triesman, 2016; Ericson 
& Zeager, 2015). This group portrays Russia as a defender (a passive victim 
compelled to respond to NATO’s expansion). The second group focuses on 
Russian geopolitical expansion as the cause of Russia’s behavior in Crimea 
(Lindley-French, 2014; Kuzio & D’Anieri, 2018; Allison, 2014; Masters, 
2020). The third group of scholars sees Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 
as an effort by the Russian government to reassert “Russian national identity” 
which sees Russia as a civilization that extends beyond Russia’s boundaries 
(Morozov, 2014; Teper, 2015; Allison, 2014; Zhurzhenko, 2014; Averre, 
2016).  
Of these three groups presented above, I stand on the side of the first 
group (NATO’s expansion). In other words, I believe the argument made by 
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scholars who argued that NATO’s expansion policy in eastern Europe 
motivated Russia to annex Crimea is more persuasive than the arguments 
made by those from the geopolitical and identity groups. The reason for my 
stand is because I was looking at the number of evidence presented by scholars 
from the three groups and I realized that scholars from the NATO expansion 
group presented more evidence to back up their argument than scholars who 
argued that geopolitical or identity factors were responsible for Russia’s action 
in Crimea. For instance, scholars from the first group who argued that NATO’s 
expansion caused Russia to intervene and annex Crimea used more statements 
from Russian state officials as evidence than scholars in the “geopolitical” and 
“identity” groups. In other words most of the evidence in the literature that I 
read points to NATO’s expansion as the main reason for Russia’s actions in 
Crimea than the geopolitical and identity arguments. There is a lack of 
sufficient evidence in the literature that I read to justify that identity and 
geopolitical factors caused Russia to intervene and annex Crimea in 2014. 
Moreover, another reason why the first group (NATO’s expansion) is 
more persuasive than the geopolitical and identity group is that scholars from 
NATO’s expansion group present more valid arguments than scholars from 
the geopolitical and identity groups. For instance, scholars from the NATO 
expansion group argued that even before the Ukraine Crisis of 2014, Russia 
had always seen NATO as an opponent to its military might. Thus, Russia’s 
views about NATO made it annex Crimea to prevent its opponent from 
establishing near its borders. This argument is valid because Russia has indeed 
seen NATO as a rivalry force long before the Ukraine crisis. Russia and 
NATO had clashed on several occasions long before the Ukraine Crisis of 
2014 like in the Cold War, which makes both sides view each other as a rival. 
Furthermore, it is insufficient to think simply in terms of geopolitical 
competition between Russia and the West with Crimea as the proving ground. 
In other words, Russia would have annexed more territories in eastern Europe 
if it was really out for geopolitical expansion in the region and not just Crimea. 
Besides, the identity argument is less convincing because Russia’s choice to 
identify with ethnic Russians, Russian-speakers, and Russian ‘compatriots’ in 
the crisis was useful in generating domestic support for coercive action in 
Crimea. The scholars who argued that Russia’s annexation of Crimea was to 
protect Russian citizens and the Russian ethnic identity present insufficient 
evidence to show that ethnic Russians in Crimea were under real threat from 
the Ukrainian government at the time. Thus, the identity argument does not 
offer significant explanatory value for such extreme Russian behavior at the 
specific time it occurred. Likewise, the argument made by the Russian 
government on the media that it intervened and annexed Crimea to protect 
ethnic Russians in Crimea seems more like justification as opposed to true 
intention. 
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The literature reviewed above revealed that the academic literature has 
seen a tendency for scholars to resurrect previous debates rather than offering 
an in-depth analysis of the implications of Russia’s actions in Crimea during 
the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. In other words, most of the literature that I read 
does not explore the consequences of Russia’s actions in Crimea during the 
Ukraine crisis. I will address this gap by discussing the consequences of 
Russia’s action in Crimea. As earlier mentioned, the literature reviewed shows 
that only a limited number of studies have been conducted on the Ukraine 
Crisis of 2014 using the English language. This study will add to the limited 
number of studies that have been conducted on the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 in 
English. 
 
4.  Theoretical/Conceptual Framework 
This section defines and operationalizes three relevant concepts used 
in this study: “defensive realism”, “offensive realism” and “national interest.” 
 
4.1. Defensive Realism 
Defensive realism is part of structural realism theory also known as 
neorealism, which is a subset of the realist school of thought in international 
relations (IR). Realism is considered as the most dominant paradigm in IR 
theory since World War II (Antunes & Camisao, 2018: 1). Other mainstream 
IR theories are liberalism, constructivism, and the English School. Defensive 
realism theory was developed by Kenneth Waltz; Waltz’s defensive realism 
offers a systemic and state-centric theory of international politics 
(Pashakhanlou, 2018: 4). The structural components of Waltz’s defensive 
realism consist of “anarchy” defined as the absence of government and the 
distribution of capabilities across the international system (Waltz, 1979: 88). 
Waltz argues that the anarchic nature of the international system encourages 
states to undertake defensive and moderate policies to attain security. 
Similarly, Waltz contends that states do everything for their survival in a world 
where their security is not assured (Waltz, 1979: 92). Waltz makes two explicit 
assumptions regarding states in his defensive realism theory. First, he assumes 
that states are unitary actors that only differ in their capabilities (Ibid). Second, 
he assumes that states pursue policies to ensure their own survival (Waltz, 
1979: 118). Waltz believes that the balance of power is an “iron law” that 
states can use to assure their survival by making sure that none of their rivals 
grow too powerful. According to Waltz, great powers possess the greatest 
capabilities to shape the character of the international system (1979, 129: 130).  
Waltz contends that a bipolar system where the balance is maintained by two 
great powers is more stable than a multipolar system in which the anarchic 
system is inhabited by three or more great powers (1979: 161). His defensive 
realism theory asserts that aggressive expansion as promoted by offensive 
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realists upsets to conform to the balance of power theory, thereby decreasing 
the primary objectives of states which is to ensure their security. Defensive 
realism assumes that states are not intrinsically aggressive and that the main 
concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in 
the international system. 
 
4.2.  Offensive Realism 
On the other hand, offensive realism is a structural theory developed 
by John J. Mearsheimer, a mainstream scholar in the neorealist camp 
(Steinsson, 2014: 2). Neorealist, Mearsheimer developed his offensive realism 
theory in response to Kenneth Waltz’s defensive realism theory. 
Mearsheimer’s offensive realism theory employs a system-centric approach to 
study states’ behavior at the international level. The theory departs from 
classical realism and employs positivism as a philosophy of science. Offensive 
realism holds that the international system is anarchic and the anarchic nature 
of the international system drive states to pursue aggressive behavior in 
international politics. Mearsheimer’s offensive realism theory mainly focuses 
on how powerful countries (great powers) such as the U.S, Russia, France, and 
the UK pursue power in international politics (Mearsheimer, 2010: 72).  
Mearsheimer bases his theory of offensive realism on five 
assumptions. The five assumptions explain why states maximize their relative 
power, think, and act offensively toward each other at the international level. 
The five assumptions or basic tenets of offensive realism theory are as follows: 
(1) Powerful countries or great powers are the main actors in world politics 
and the international system is anarchic, which means that there is no hierarchy 
or superior power that can control the behavior of states (Mearsheimer 2001: 
30). (2) States inherently possess some offensive military capabilities which 
they are capable of using against other states (Mearsheimer, 2001: 31). (3) No 
state can be certain about other states’ intentions. States always want to know 
whether other states are determined to use force (Ibid). (4) The most basic 
motive driving state is survival. In other words, states seek to maintain their 
survival (their territorial integrity and domestic autonomy) above other goals 
(Ibid). (5) States are rational actors and they think strategically to maximize 
their prospects for survival (Mearsheimer, 2001: 31). Mearsheimer noted that 
other than these five assumptions, realist scholars like him share the belief that 
power is the currency of international politics (Mearsheimer, 2010: 74). 
Likewise, Mearsheimer explained that these five conditions or assumptions of 
offensive realism have created a situation where states fear each other. They 
fear each other and view each other as a potential enemy which has led to the 
belief that the best way to guarantee their security is to achieve hegemony, not 
the balance of power (Ibid).  
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Mearsheimer’s Offensive realism theory assumes that powerful states 
do everything to maximize their relative power, not absolute power until 
hegemony is achieved. His offensive realism theory portrays the international 
system as a jungle where each state relies on self-help for its survival. Also, 
Mearsheimer’s offensive realism theory starts with similar assumptions as 
Kenneth Waltz’s defensive realism theory but reaches dissimilar conclusions. 
For example, both theories start with similar assumptions for anarchy, the 
capabilities assumption, and the survival assumption. However, as can be seen 
from above, a central conclusion reach by Waltz is that of the balance of 
power. Waltz argues that a recurrent pattern of balancing occurs where states 
ally with weaker states to balance stronger states (Waltz, 1979: 117). 
Contrarily, Mearsheimer rejects Waltz’s conclusion and argues that states can 
never truly be secure and that states can only ensure their survival through 
power maximization (Mearsheimer, 2001: 61). In other words, Mearsheimer 
concludes that the best way for states to guarantee their security is to achieve 
hegemony, not the balance of power. 
 
4.3.  National Interest 
Another IR concept used in this paper is Weldes’ concept of “national 
interest.” Weldes Jutta is a critical scholar from the critical constructivist camp 
in IR theory. Other critical approaches to IR are feminist, critical theorist, neo-
Marxist, neo-Gramscian, and post-structuralist. Weldes criticize the 
conventional realist notion of “national interest.” Drawing from Alexander 
Wendt, Weldes provides a constructivist reconceptualization of national 
interest (Weldes, 1996: 280). Her concept of national interest employs a 
critical constructivist approach to study states’ behavior at the international 
level. In addition, her concept of national interest employs post-positivism as 
a philosophy of science. Weldes argues that “national interest” is an important 
concept to study international politics and states’ actions because it is the 
language that states use to justify their actions at the international level and to 
create their foreign policy (Weldes, 1996: 276). Moreover, Weldes contends 
that the concept of national interest is important in world politics for two 
reasons: (1) it is through the concept of national interest that policymakers 
understand the goals to be followed by a state’s foreign policy. (2) The concept 
of national interest acts as a rhetorical device through which the legitimacy 
and political support for state action are generated (Ibid). Thus, the concept of 
national interest helps to create and legitimize the actions taken by states at 
the international level. From a critical constructivist standpoint, Weldes 
explains that the concept of national interest should be understood as a social 
construction. She argues that before state officials can act on behalf of a state, 
they must engage in a process of interpretation to understand the situation that 
they face and how they should respond to it (Weldes, 1996: 276-277).  
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According to Weldes, the process of interpretation requires a shared 
language from state officials who are responsible to decide for the state and 
the audience for whom the state action must be legitimate. Weldes maintains 
that the shared language is that of “national interest” (Ibid). Moreover, Weldes 
explains that the content of national interest is produced in a process of 
representation through which state officials and others understand their 
international context. She assumes that national interest is constructed and that 
the national interest is created as a meaningful object, out of share meaning 
through which states' action in the international system is understood (Weldes, 
1996: 277). I used Weldes’ concept of national interest, Waltz’s defensive 
realism theory, and Mearsheimer’s offensive realism theory in my analysis to 
explain why Russia intervened and eventually annexed Crimea during the 
Ukraine Crisis of 2014. 
 
5  Methodology  
5.1.  Methods and Scope of Research 
To start with, this study was conducted using a qualitative and a non-
positivist approach to research (interpretivist) which is centered on the 
humanistic view of the social sciences. I used the process-tracing method for 
this study because of the need to establish a causal mechanism and explain 
why Russia intervened and annexed Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. 
The process-tracing method is where the researcher seeks to find observable 
implications of hypothesized claims (Bennet, 2010). In this study, I 
hypothesize that NATO’s expansion policy in eastern Europe is the underlying 
cause of Russia’s intervention and annexation of Crimea. Hence, I traced the 
cause which is my independent variable (NATO’s expansion) to the effect, my 
dependent variable (the intervention and annexation of Crimea). As Bennet 
explains, process tracing is useful in this regard because it allows for a forward 
and backward trace of the cause to the effect under investigation. 
In terms of case selection techniques, I employ a “typical case selection 
technique.”  
Gerring explained that a typical case selection technique intends to 
explore a typical case of some phenomena (2017: 22). The topic of this paper 
(the Ukraine Crisis of 2014) is an example of a typical case. I decided to use 
this technique rather than other techniques such as the extreme case or the 
deviant case technique because I wanted to study the casual process in-depth. 
As Gerring explained, with the typical case selection technique, the researcher 
selects to study the causal process in depth (Ibid). Furthermore, this study was 
conducted using qualitative secondary data collected from publicly available 
documents (articles). Qualitative data are very useful in a study like this one 
that focuses on a single case or event (Gerring, 2017: 20). The documents were 
collected electronically from the internet.  
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Although it would have been nice to conduct this study using other 
sources of data such as primary data from interviews, I decided to use publicly 
available documents because it saves more time than gathering data from other 
sources such as surveys and in-depth interviews. Besides, the documentary 
analysis method that I used in this study is in line with the methods used by 
other researchers that have conduct research on this topic as can be seen in the 
literature review section. The data consist of online articles on Russia’s 
intervention and annexation of Crimea from 2014 to 2020. This time frame 
was selected because it covers the period when there were a lot of discussions 
in the media about the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. I coded my data using NVivo 
to identify major themes used in the articles to explain why Russia intervened 
and annexed Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. I decided to code my 
data using NVivo because the presence of nodes in NVivo provides “a simple 
to work with structure” for creating codes and discovering themes (Zamawe, 
2015: 5). 
As aforementioned, the theories of offensive realism, defensive 
realism, and national interest guided my analysis of why Russia intervened 
and annexed Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. 
This study intended to develop explanations direct from the data. As a result, 
the theories were constructed from the data, hence, an inductive approach. 
Furthermore, David Silverman recommends that as researchers, we should try 
to use concepts and theories that are closely related to our discipline (2006: 6). 
The three concepts/theories used are appropriate for this study because 
scholars in the IR field often used them to analyze wars and international 
conflicts. Next, I analyzed my data using qualitative content analysis (QCA). 
Qualitative content analysis can be defined as a research method for subjective 
interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification 
process of coding and identifying themes or patterns (Hsieh & Shannon, 2015: 
1278) QCA has been identified by numerous scholars as one of the best 
methods to study texts or documents. I used QCA to look at how language was 
used in the articles to explain why Russia intervened and annexed Crimea 
during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 and to identify major themes in the articles. 
The following question guided my analysis: (1) what motivated Russia to 
intervened and annexed Crimea during the crisis? This question helped me to 
identify key themes used in the data to talk about the rationale behind Russia’s 
actions in Crimea. 
I structured the presentation of my evidence in the result section first 
by presenting evidence that Russia intervened and annexed Crimea from 
Ukraine during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 because of the threat of NAT0’s 
expansion near its borders. Next, I present evidence of alternative arguments 
on why Russia behaved the way it did in Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis of 
2014. The evidence that I present in the results section is sentences from my 
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data (the articles). I presented the evidence under different themes that 
emerged from my data. And I employ an interpretive approach to research by 
using these sentences from the articles to explain why Russia intervened and 
annexed Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. To limit the scope of this 
study, this study focused mainly on Crimea and the events that occurred there 
during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. This study is not interested in other aspects 
of the crisis such as the legality of Russia’s intervention and annexation of 
Crimea or the debates on whether the Ukraine crisis was the West’s or Russia’s 
fault. 
 
6.  Results and Analysis 
This section of this paper presents the results and analysis to answer 
the research question: Why did Russia intervene and annex Crimea during the 
Ukraine Crisis of 2014?  
It presents and discusses the results of the text analysis of the articles 
that I examined in this study. As aforementioned, I got the findings of this 
study by using qualitative content analysis to look at how language was used 
in my data to explain the rationale behind Russia’s actions in Crimea during 
the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. My findings revealed that Russia intervened and 
annexed Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 because of NATO’s 
expansion policy in eastern Europe. This finding is in line with the central 
thesis/argument of this paper. However, my findings also revealed that they 
are alternative arguments on the rationale behind Russia’s intervention and 
annexation of Crimea in 2014. The results will be presented and analyzed 
under the following themes that emerged from my data: “NATO’s expansion”, 
“great power status”, “Nationalism and Russian national identity.” 
 
6.1  Why Russia Intervened and Annexed Crimea in 2014 
6.1.1.  NATO’s Expansion 
After coding my data with NVivo “NATO’s expansion” emerged as a 
central theme to explain the rationale behind Russia’s intervention and 
annexation of Crimea. For instance, one article by Charles Ziegler stated that 
“Russia intervened and annexed Crimea in 2014 because NATO’s expansion 
in eastern Europe threatened Russia’s security” (2020: 14). Similarly, another 
article stated that “Russian President Vladimir Putin admitted in a televised 
interview in Spring 2014  that Russia’s annexation of Crimea, home to its 
Black Sea Fleet, was partly influenced by NATO’s expansion into eastern 
Europe” (Reuters, 2014). Again, another article stated that “Russia was forced 
to act in Crimea because of the expansion of western institutions such as 
NATO near Russia’s borders” (Walker, 2014). The above statements from my 
data show that Russia intervened and annexed Crimea during the Ukraine 
Crisis of 2014 because of NATO’s expansion policy in eastern Europe. This 
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finding is similar to the findings of Lane 2006; Mearsheirmer 2014; Triesman 
2016; Bebler; 2015 and others discussed in the literature review section of this 
paper. Russia’s decision to intervene and annex Crimea from Ukraine because 
of NATO’s expansion policy can be analyzed using both Kenneth Waltz’s 
defensive realism and John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism as can be seen 
below. 
To start with, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was 
founded in 1949 by the United States, Canada, and other western European 
countries to oppose and contained the Soviet Union. Before the Ukraine crisis 
and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia had always seen NATO as an 
opponent and a threat to its security (Brent, 2018). In addition, Russia has been 
against NATO’’s expansion policies in eastern Europe since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union (Ibid). However, the alliance has been ignoring Russia’s 
opposition to its expansion policy in eastern Europe over the years by 
admitting eastern European states as new members into the alliance. The first 
round of NATO’s expansion policy in eastern Europe occurred in 1999 when 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined the alliance. The second 
enlargement took place in 2004 when Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined NATO (Mearsheimer, 2014: 78).  
The move by these countries to join NATO antagonized Russia 
because these countries belonged to the former Soviet Union. The situation 
became worse in 2008 when NATO announced that it would accept Georgia 
and Ukraine as new members of its alliance. The move further antagonized 
Russia because these two countries share a border with Russia. Russia saw the 
possibility of its closest neighbor to the south (Ukraine) joining NATO as a 
direct threat to its security. Russian President Vladimir Putin echoed these 
sentiments when he openly told the West that admitting Ukraine and Georgia 
as NATO members would be “a direct threat to Russia” (Mearshiemer, 
2014:79). Russia understood that Ukraine joining NATO would mean that 
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet will be evicted from its long-standing base in the 
Crimean city of Sevastopol and NATO’s navy will be station in this city. 
Russia understood that if this happened, it would create a real threat to the 
whole of southern Russia.  
To prevent Russia from losing the Crimean city of Sevastopol as a 
result of Ukraine joining NATO and to halt NATO’s expansion near its 
borders, Russia decided to intervene in eastern Ukraine and annex the strategic 
Crimean peninsula. Russia’s decision to intervened and annexed Crimea 
because of NATO’s expansion near its borders was motivated by legitimate 
security concerns. In this scenario NATO can be seen as an aggressor 
provoking Russia while Russia can be seen as a defender, defending its 
territory from the perceived security threat pose by NATO’s expansion near 
its borders. In other words, Russia can be seen as a defensive realist as 
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explained by Waltz in his defensive realism theory (Waltz, 1979). Likewise, 
Russia’s action is an example of defensive state behavior in international 
politics as Waltz explains in his defensive realism theory. The defensive action 
taken by Russia to annex Crimea because of the threat pose by NATO’s 
expansion near its borders confirms waltz’s argument that the anarchic nature 
of the international system encourages states to use defensive and moderate 
measures to attain security (1979: 92).  
Furthermore, Russian military intervention and annexation of Crimea 
demonstrate the West’s miscalculation of the length that Russia would go to 
protect its strategic objectives and its security. It was unacceptable for Russia 
to have a neighbor and a strategic territory such as Crimea fall into the hands 
of the West. Moreover, Russia’s actions to annex Crimea because of NATO’s 
expansion policy in eastern Europe show that Russia was trying to balance 
power with NATO in the region. This is because several states in eastern 
Europe had already joined NATO and Ukraine Russia’s neighbor was also 
making plans to become a NATO member. Russia understood that doing 
nothing in Ukraine means allowing NATO to gain more influence and power 
in the region. To prevent this from happening, Russia decided to invade 
Ukraine and annex Crimea. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 shows its 
willingness to balance power with NATO in eastern Europe and to prevent 
NATO from becoming too powerful in the region. This action taken by Russia 
to balance power in the region validates the argument made by Waltz in his 
defensive realism theory that the balance of power is an “iron law” that states 
can use to assure their survival by making sure that their rivals do not grow 
too powerful (1979: 188). 
On the other hand, though the actions taken by the Russian government 
to annex Crimea because of NATO’s expansion can be seen as defensive, how 
Russia carried out the actions is offensive. In other words, how Russia 
intervened and annexed Crimea from Ukraine during the Ukraine Crisis of 
2014 is an example of an aggressive/offensive state behavior in international 
politics as explain by John Mearsheimer in his offensive realism theory. This 
is because reports from the Ukrainian government indicated that there was a 
significant influx of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine before the annexation 
of Crimea by Russia in 2014 (Becker, Cohen, Kushi & McManus 2016: 120). 
Ukraine was a sovereign state before this conflict; however, Russia turned a 
blind eye to Ukraine’s sovereignty and intervened militarily by sending its 
military into Crimea to take control over key installations such as airports and 
state buildings. The fact that Russia acts rationally, albeit aggressively by 
sending its military into Ukraine and illegally annexing Crimea without 
Ukraine’s permission to achieve its security goals makes Russia looks like an 
aggressor. In other words, Russia’s actions in Crimea during the Ukraine crisis 
make Russia look like an offensive realist as describe by Mearsheimer (2001). 
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Further, Mearsheimer explains in his offensive realism theory that 
States are rational actors, and they think strategically to maximize their 
prospects for survival (Mearsheimer, 2001: 31). Russia’s decision to intervene 
and annex Crimea because of NATO‘s expansion policy is a rational action 
taken by Russia to maximize its prospects for survival in an international 
system that is anarchy. Likewise, the aggressive manner in which Russia took 
to intervene and eventually annex Crimea in 2014 validates the assumption of 
offensive realism that states use aggressive/offensive measures to ensure their 
survival. However, it contradicts the assumption of Waltz’s defensive realism 
that states are not intrinsically aggressive (1979: 161).  
Next, the third assumption of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism theory 
assumes that powerful states are never certain about other states’ intentions, 
which makes them use offensive actions to guarantee their security 
(Mearsheimer, 2010: 73-74). Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 validates 
this third assumption of offensive realism on the perception of threat and 
survival because Russia is an example of the powerful states that Mearsheimer 
describes in his offensive realism theory. And as a powerful state, Russia was 
not certain about NATO’s intentions near its borders; it perceived NATO’s 
expansion on its borders as a threat that is why it acted aggressively by sending 
its military into Crimea to seize control of the territory. As Mearsheimer 
explains, great powers like Russia are always sensitive to potential threats near 
their home territory (2014: 18). Thus, Russia would rather destroy Ukraine as 
a functional state than allow it to become a Western stronghold on Russia’s 
doorsteps. 
Moreover, Russia’s annexation of Crimea to prevent NATO’s 
enlargement policy in eastern Europe validates the assumption of both 
offensive realism and defensive realism that great powers are the main actors 
in international politics and that the international system is anarchy (Waltz, 
1979: Mearsheimer, 2001). A smaller or a weaker country such as Sudan or 
Luxemburg would not have had the effrontery to march into Crimea and 
forcefully annexed it from Ukraine. Russia dared to carry out this aggressive 
action because it is one of the offensive great powers that Mearsheimer 
describes in his offensive realism theory. Besides, Russia’s military might and 
its military capabilities that were stationed in the Crimean port of Sevastopol 
made it possible for it to annex Crimea easily from Ukraine. This validates the 
assumption of both offensive and defensive realism that great powers possess 
the greatest military capabilities to shape the character of the international 
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6.2  Other Findings 
6.2.1.  Great Power Status 
On the other hand, several themes also emerged from my data to show 
that there are alternative arguments on the rationale behind Russia’s 
intervention and annexation of Crimea in 2014. As an example “great power 
status” is one of the central themes that emerged from my data to support these 
alternative arguments. For instance, one article by Steven Ward stated that 
“Russia intervened and annexed Crimea because of Putin’s desire to restore 
Russia’s great power status” (2014). Another article stated that “Russia 
annexed Crimea in 2014 because it wanted to show the world that despite the 
collapse of the Soviet Union; Russia is still a great power” (Gigitashvili, 
2016). These statements from my data reveal that Russia also intervened and 
annexed Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 because it wanted to restore 
its status as a great power. The question is why Russia was trying to restore its 
status as a great power? 
The reason why Russia wanted to restore its status as a great power is 
that during the Post Cold War era, the US and its Western allies no longer 
treated Russia as a “great power.” The most important manifestation of 
Russian demotion from the ranks of great power was the new willingness by 
the West to encroach upon what had been understood during the Cold War as 
Russia’s sphere of influence. The expansion of NATO in eastern Europe and 
the growing Western ties with Ukraine and other former member states of the 
Soviet Union in eastern Europe is evidence that the West had failed to accord 
Russia with the status of great power that it had before the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. However, Russia has always considered itself as a “great 
power” (Nixey, 2015), and Russian state officials understood that great power 
status means that Russia must have hegemony and exercise some form of 
leadership including domination over its region (eastern Europe). They 
understood that having hegemony and dominance in eastern Europe would 
also ensure Russia’s security in the region. As Mearsheimer explains in his 
offensive realism theory the best way for great powers like Russia to ensure 
their security is to achieve hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2001: 61).  
Mearsheimer believes that achieving hegemony would eliminate any 
possibility of a challenge by another great power (Ibid). Russia intervened and 
annexed Crimea because it felt that its dominance in the region was threatened 
by the expansion of NATO since many countries in eastern Europe that were 
former members of the Soviet Union were joining the Alliance. Russian state 
officials understood that intervening and annexing Crimea will show Russia’s 
dominance in the region and will eliminate any challenge from the West. 
Additionally, Russia’s decision to intervene and annex Crimea during the 
Ukraine Crisis of 2014 was a rational and strategic move made by Russia to 
ensure its survival. This move by Russia validates the fifth assumption of 
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offensive realism that states are rational actors and they think strategically to 
maximize their prospects for survival (Mearsheimer, 2001: 31). 
 
6.2.2.  Nationalism and National Identity 
Another major theme that emerged from my data to show the rationale 
behind Russia’s intervention and eventual annexation of Crimea is 
“Nationalism and National identity.”  
For example, one article by Eleanor Knott stated that “Russia annexed 
the Crimean peninsula in March 2014 because it sees the people of Crimean 
as Russians” (2015). Another article stated that “Russia did what it did in 
Crimea during the Ukraine crisis of 2014 because of its nationalist worldview 
that sees Crimea as part of greater Russia and a victim of ever-encroaching 
Western hostilities” (Fisher, 2014). The statements above obtained from my 
data show that Russia decided to intervene in Ukraine and annexed Crimea 
during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 because it wanted to protect the “Russian 
civilization” or “Russian national identity” since it sees the people of Crimea 
and Russia as one. This finding is similar to the findings of other scholars 
discussed in the literature review section of this paper which revealed that 
Russia intervened and annexed Crimea in 2014 to protect the Russian identity 
(Morozov, 2014; Teper, 2015; Allison, 2014; Zhurzhenko, 2014; Averre, 
2016).  
Russian President Vladimir Putin made Russian citizens in Russia 
believe that the “Russian civilization” or identity which extends beyond 
Russia’s borders was under threat from the West and that Russia’s actions in 
Crimea were to protect the Russian civilization or identity from the western 
culture. This is because senior state officials in Russia view the people of 
Russia and Crimea as one. The reason why Russian officials see the people of 
Crimea and Russia as one is because the majority of the Crimean population 
is ethnically Russian (Knott, 2015). Putin interpreted and understood that 
Crimea and Russia have a special historical link and that the majority of the 
Crimean population is ethnic Russians. This is the reason why he decided to 
act by sending Russia’s military into Crimea to annex the territory from 
Ukraine under the guise of protecting the majority ethnic Russian population 
in Crimea whom he identified as Russians. Putin’s interpretation and 
subsequent reaction validate the argument made by Weldes in his national 
interest concept that before states officials can act on behalf of a state, they 
must first engage in a process of interpretation to understand the situation that 
the state face and how they should respond to it (1996: 276). 
Similarly, Russian state officials used nationalist rhetoric to describe 
the people of Russia and Crimea as one, and this rhetoric paid particularly well 
by increasing public support for Putin’s action in Crimea and increasing 
Putin’s popularity rating in Russia (Kolsto, 2016: 702). Russian state officials 
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use this rhetoric to gain the support of the majority of Russian citizens in 
Russia especially Russian nationalists and to make them believe that 
protecting the Russian identity in Crimea was good for Russia’s national 
interest. This nationalistic rhetoric used by senior Russian state officials to win 
the support of Russian citizens in Russia confirms Weldes’ argument that the 
concept of national interest can act as a rhetoric device through which the 
legitimacy and political support for state action are generated (1996: 276). 
Putin and other senior Russian state officials used the nationalistic rhetoric as 
a device to generate support for Russia’s action in Crimea from ordinary 
Russian citizens in Russia.  
 
7.  Consequences of Russia’s Action in Crimea 
7.1  Tension between NATO and Russia 
Russia’s intervention and annexation of Crimea during the Ukraine 
Crisis of 2014 have led to several consequences. One of the consequences is 
that it has caused serious tension between NATO and Russia (Monaghan, 
2014). In other words, Russia’s intervention and eventual annexation of 
Crimea in 2014 have made NATO’s relationship with Russia to be more 
difficult than it has been any time since the end of the Cold War. The NATO-
Russia relations have been central in the evolution of Russia’s relationship 
with the West since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Sharyl, 2015: 153). 
However, the relationship has gotten worse in recent years as a result of 
Russia’s forceful intervention and annexation of Crimea in 2014. On the one 
hand, NATO accuses Russia of aggression for intervening and illegally 
annexing Crimea from Ukraine. On the other hand, Russia rejects NATO’s 
accusation and argues that its actions in Crimea were taken to secure its 
interest against NATO’s expansion and as a response to a crisis provoked by 
the US and the EU (Monaghan, 2014).  
These arguments made by both sides emphasize tension and the lack 
of trust between them. The tensions between NATO and Russia created by the 
Ukraine Crisis of 2014 threatens not only to devastate our society but also 
unravel all progress made in building peace and security in the world since the 
end of the Cold War. Anthony Ian contends that there is little prospect for 
lasting improvements in the NATO–Russia relations (2012: 119). 
Nevertheless, efforts must be made by Western policymakers and Russia to 
repair the damages that the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 created to the NATO-
Russian relations. This is necessary for the world to enjoy international peace 
and stability. 
 
7.2  Increase Military Spending  
Russia’s intervention and eventual annexation of Crimea in 2014 have 
forced many European countries to increase their military spending. Many of 
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these European countries see Russia’s intervention and annexation of Crimea 
as a threat to their own security. For instance, after Russia annexed Crimea in 
2014, the government of Ukraine decided to increase its military spending 
significantly (Beswick, 2019). President Petro Poroshenko announced that 
Ukraine would increase its military spending to almost 3 billion US dollars 
(Ibid). Several central and north European countries bordering Russia also 
announced increases in their military spending as a direct response to Russia’s 
actions in Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. Most European countries 
of the former Soviet Union such as Latvia and Lithuania were among the top 
10 countries which increase their military spending in 2018 due to the 
perception of threat from Russia with totals of 24% and 18% respectively 
(Ibid). Similarly, Finland which shares a land border with Russia and Sweden 
a sea neighbor both increased their military spending between 2017 and 2018 
as a result of Russia’s behavior in Crimea in 2014. Further, in the wake of the 
Ukraine crisis which led to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the United States 
NATO’s dominant power seized on the crisis to drive home its argument that 
allies must spend more on their own defense. It called on NATO member 
states to recommit to a long-standing target that NATO members should spend 
2% of their economic output on defense. However, while NATO countries 
made ‘pledges’ to increase their military spending to 2% this is all most have 
done to meet the target. 
 
7.3  International Sanctions 
In response to Russia's intervention and annexation of Crimea in 2014, 
international sanctions were imposed on Russia by foreign countries. The 
sanctions were imposed by the EU, USA, Canada, and several other countries 
against individuals, businesses, and officials from Russia and Ukraine who 
played roles in the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 (Davis, 2016: 184-185). Other 
measures taken by the EU and the USA against Russia include trade 
embargoes and restrictions on finance (Ibid). Additionally, the Ukrainian 
government also carried out several sanctions against Russia for intervening 
and annexing Crimea in 2014. For instance, the Ukrainian government banned 
Russian planes from flying through Ukrainian airspace. The international 
sanctions had several negative effects on Russia. As an example, the sanctions 
lowered Russia’s dollar earnings from energy exports, which weakened the 
financial positions of its banks, businesses, and government (Davis, 2016: 
185). 
Moreover, the sanctions also contributed to the collapse of the Russian 
ruble. Russia responded to the international sanctions by adopting numerous 
countermeasures such as imposing a total ban on food imports from the EU, 
USA, Norway, Canada, and Australia. Concerning Ukraine, Russia imposed 
restrictions on the export of industrial and agricultural goods to Russia, cut 
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energy subsidies, and demanded pre-payment of gas supplies (Gardner, 2014). 
In March 2015, Russia also prohibited Western IT firms that were operating 
in Russia from bidding for state contracts. The Western sanctions imposed on 
Russia because of its actions in Crimea in 2014 are regularly extended every 
year. The international sanctions have caused economic damages to both 
Russia and Western states. In June 2019, President Putin confirmed that since 
2014 Russia has lost about $ 50 billion due to international sanctions imposed 
against Russia because of its actions in Crimea (CSFI, 2021). At the same 
time, the EU lost $240 billion and the USA lost $ 17 billion (Ibid). These 
figures show that the international sanctions that resulted from Russia’s 
intervention and eventual annexation of Crimea are having a negative effect 
not just on Russia but also on Ukraine and several Western countries. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined why Russia intervened and eventually 
annexed Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. The paper argued that 
Russia intervened and annexed Crimea during the crisis because of NATO’s 
expansion policy in eastern Europe. The results of this study support the 
central thesis/argument stated above. However, the results of this study also 
revealed that there are alternative arguments on the rationale behind Russia's 
intervention and eventual annexation of Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis of 
2014. As can be seen from the findings of this study, the implication of 
focusing on NATO’s expansion policy as the main motive behind Russia’s 
intervention and annexation of Crimea is that people might ignore the role that 
other factors such as nationalism, identity, and Russia’s quest for great power 
status played in influencing Russia’s behavior.  
As this paper suggests, it is possible to argue that NATO’s expansion 
policy in eastern Europe and other factors pushed Russia to intervened and 
eventually annexed Crimea during the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. I acknowledge 
the limitations of this study. Another kind of evidence could be used in place 
of the statements from the articles. However, this evidence is the best source I 
could go after due to time constraints. Also, this study being a case study 
research provide little basis for generalization of its findings. This paper was 
not able to address other dimensions of the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 such as the 
legality of Russia’s intervention and annexation of Crimea in 2014; it would 
be interesting to study this area. Thus, future research on this topic can focus 
on the legality of Russia’s intervention and annexation of Crimea under 
international law (the UN Charter). This will contribute to a greater 
understanding of the contemporary debate on Russia’s behavior in Crimea 
during the crisis. Likewise, future research on this topic can look at the 
political, economical, and social changes that have taken place in the Crimean 
peninsula after it was annexed by Russia seven years ago. As indicated in this 
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paper, Russia’s actions in Crimea during the Ukraine crisis have worsened the 
NATO-Russian relations, and this has caused global security challenges. To 
resolve this problem, I would suggest more collaboration between the 
government of Russia and NATO member countries. 
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